meaning "New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation, with the ABN 24 960 729 253". This would appear to alter the words chosen by the parties. Nevertheless, this was acceptable to both Kunc J. at first instance and the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which emphasised the context surrounding the performance bonds: their purpose was to fulfil the underlying contractual obligations of Nebax towards the Corporation, and favouree of the bonds should be understood to be the same as the counterparty to the underlying contract -in other words, the Corporation.
The High Court firmly rejected such a "loose approach to construction" (at [11] per French C.J.). As French C.J. clearly explained in his concurrence, two complementary principles apply to performance bonds: the principle of strict compliance and the principle of autonomy. The latter demands that the performance bond be interpreted independently, and should not be qualified by reference to the terms of the underlying contract: the bank should be able to rely upon the language of the bond alone, without investigating the underlying the contract. Further burdens should not be placed on banks which issue performance bonds. The former principle requires the bond to be interpreted strictly, such that the bank only has an obligation to pay -and can only claim an indemnity for its performance -if the conditions on which the bank is authorised and compelled to make payment are strictly observed. This is important. The joint judgment of Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ. explains that a bank is contractually bound to adhere to the terms of a bond; by paying a party not named on the face of the instrument the bank may be exposed to claims for breach of contract. It is therefore understandable why ANZ did not pay the Corporation on demand.
The significance of context and the "factual matrix" within which an agreement is concluded is a controversial subject. The lower courts in Simic considered the relevant background material to include the underlying agreement, and felt able to interpret a term of the contract other than in accordance with its plain meaning. The High Court sensibly refused to endorse such a liberal approach towards interpretation. The nature and function of performance bonds demands a strict approach towards interpretation. It is suggested that a strict approach should also be favoured more generally, and that English law appears to be moving in this direction too (see e.g. In Simic, the performance bonds were agreed between Nabax and ANZ in favour of the Corporation. When deciding whether to rectify the bonds, the High Court rightly focussed on the intentions of Nabax (through Mr Simic) and ANZ (through Ms Hanna). Mr Simic was clearly mistaken, since he intended the favouree of the bonds to be the Corporation. It seems appropriate to conclude that Ms Hanna had a similar intention that the bonds reflected what was required under the underlying contract. After all, if someone had pointed out to Mr Simic and Ms Hanna that the name of the counterparty was wrong straight away, then both parties would surely have agreed immediately. It follows that the performance bonds did not reflect the parties' actual intentions due to a common mistake, and rectification was granted.
In rectifying the performance bonds, the High Court applied the traditional test for rectification on the basis of common mistake. The written instrument was made to conform to the true agreement of the parties, and that agreement does not need to be specifically enforceable. [60] ) that "the terms of the contract to which the subsequent instrument must conform must be objectively determined in the same way as any other contract", and that "the question is what an objective observer would have thought the intentions of the parties to be". As the concurring judgments illustrate, this is a departure from traditional equitable principle which concentrates on the parties' actual intentions. It is difficult to see why an earlier objective accord should trump a later, formal agreement unless the written instrument fails to reflect the parties' actual intentions. Moreover, Lord Hoffmann's approach surprisingly allows a court to find a common mistake because a reasonable person would consider that one party was mistaken, even if one party was not actually mistaken at all (cf. The approach in Simic reflects the traditional approach to rectification; both French C.J. and Kiefel J. were clear that the views of Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook involve a departure from that approach. Both Justices said that Australia should not follow this aspect of Chartbrook without full argument in a case where the issue was relevant to the outcome. This is sensible, and it is suggested that Lord Hoffmann's approach should not be endorsed in any event. Indeed, even in England Lord Hoffmann's approach has given rise to much controversy, and a number of judges have been moved to express strong views in extra-judicial speeches and articles (for a sample, see Davies [2016] 
